Pitcher attrition and bullpen fallout

Here is my ESPN piece for this week.

As of today, 41 percent of the pre-season Top 300 have been disabled, demoted or designated for assignment. That’s only about 10 players away from the 44 percent attrition accumulated over a full season in 2010. We are on pace for about 70 percent turnover of our highest-drafted players, which would far surpass the record of 53 percent, set in 2014.

Last week, I noted how the fallout has affected the number of 200-inning starting pitchers each year. While it’s never easy to replace a fallen frontline starter, innings can come from anywhere so there are usually several options to backfill the open roster spot.

However, this attrition also affects our bullpens, and it is far more difficult to replace a closer from an unstable pool of about 30. Currently, there are only 13 closers on pace for 30 saves, which would be the lowest number since 2003. The declining trend of 30-save closers each year is not as stark as with the 200-inning starters, but it’s still there nonetheless.

Number of 30-Save Closers, By Year

2008   15
2009   16
2010   14
2011   19
2012   15
2013   19
2014   17
2015   21
2016   16
2017   13 projected

In 2017 drafts, there were 32 relief pitchers who were rostered for the sole purpose of accumulating saves. So far, only 12 of them are earning a profit on their acquisition cost. Ten of them are returning less than half of their draft price. These busts include $20-plus buys like Aroldis Chapman, Zach Britton and Mark Melancon, who have spent a good part of the season on the disabled list. It also includes failed closers, like Jeanmar Gomez, Neftali Feliz, Francisco Rodriguez and Sam Dyson.

While the number of 30-save closers is down, the effect is exacerbated by a dearth of saves in general. In short, the saves simply aren’t coming:

Total League-Wide Saves, By Year

2008   1,184
2009   1,202
2010   1,204
2011   1,243
2012   1,261
2013   1,266
2014   1,264
2015   1,292
2016   1,276
2017   1,178 projected

The 1,178 saves pace this year would be the lowest level since 2000.

The splintering of the saves pool is borne out by all these anomalies:

• Six of the eight most profitable closers this year came from pitchers who owners did not see fit to pay even $10 for on draft day. Greg Holland (pictured) leads the pack, currently earning $30 on a draft price of only $6. Draft day also-rans Brandon Kintzler, Raisel Iglesias, Jim Johnson, Fernando Rodney and Addison Reed are all earning double-digit profit.
• Six closers drew $20-plus bids on draft day, equivalent to an ADP 70 or better pick. Only one – Kenley Jansen – is earning back his owners’ investment (a nice $12 profit, actually). The other five are each $6 in the red, or worse.
• The six closers yielding the biggest losses to their owners are collectively returning -$111. Their draft day cost was $103. Sam Dyson created the biggest hole, a -$18 loss on an $11 draft price.
• We used to be able to count on solid ratios and support metrics from the best closers. Five of the top 15 saves sources are putting up ERAs that are not at all helpful. Fernando Rodney is one of five closers with at least 20 saves, but he hurts his team with a 4.55 ERA and over 4.5 walks per 9 innings. Brandon Maurer has a 6.53 ERA with his 14 saves. Kelvin Herrera has a career-worst 4.35 ERA along with his 18 saves. Kenneth Giles, Seung-Hwan Oh and Jim Johnson all have at least 15 saves but ERAs north of 3.60.

Historically, the fantasy marketplace has responded to the volatility of closers by reducing the price owners pay for saves each year. Seasons in which there is higher closer turnover typically generate stingier bidding the following spring. In general, though, closer prices have plummeted over the past decade. From the Baseball Forecaster:

Average Closer Draft Cost, By Year

2008               $17.78
2009               $17.56
2010               $16.96
2011               $15.47
2012               $15.28
2013               $15.55
2014               $15.54
2015               $14.79
2016               $13.30
2017               $13.63

While this year’s closer acquisitions saw a slight uptick in average price, the group of 32, as a whole, is currently earning $12.47. No matter how you cut it, investing in saves at the draft is a losing investment.

In the past, I used a rule of thumb for valuing closers. The role alone was worth $10. Then I’d add $1 for each level of skill the pitcher brought to the table. The highest skilled closers would be worth $20, or maybe a few dollars more.

In the current environment, I’d reduce the value of the role perhaps to $5, and then work up from there. Integrating risk management into the equation, I probably would not pay more than $15 for any closer.

However, even though the number of saves is down, there will always be saves, and the better teams will typically get more of them. So your investment should be targeted to the better teams, regardless of the quality of the arm. Intuitively, we might believe that the risk is higher with poorer skilled pitchers, but did we ever think that Brandon Kintzler would be a better investment than Kelvin Herrera back on draft day? Small sample sizes wreak havoc with expectations.

That general advice applies to any closer decisions you have to make, at any time of year. Even now…

• While Kenneth Giles’ metrics seem pedestrian, you’d have to bet on the possibility of a second half surge just because he’s on the Astros.
• You have to expect that Fernando Rodney will continue to amass a large number of saves on the Diamondbacks, regardless of his terrible ERA.
• Brandon Maurer is on pace for about 27 saves. Given his 6.53 ERA and Padres teammates, I’d bet the under on that.
• Despite Francisco Rodriguez’s failures thus far, he has to be a consideration just because he could close for the Nationals.

It’s how we need to deal with saves today. Team first, skill second, prayer third.