BABS and the baseballs

by Pat Cloghessy

It’s the baseball, stupid. 

In 2019, baseballs are leaving the yard at a rate of 2.76 HR/game, which would break the record  of 2.52, set in 2017. Are changes to the ball responsible? Is the ball “juiced”? Justin Verlander thinks so. It appears his comments have merit.

Baseball America provides a summary of how even small changes to the baseball can have significant repercussions. This season, AAA affiliates adopted the use of the same baseball used in the majors:

“In Triple-A baseball this year, home runs are up 55 percent. Last year there were 7 percent more home runs in Triple-A than Double-A. This year, there are 79 percent more home runs in Triple-A than Double-A.”

Double-A does not use the same baseball. 

What does this mean for fantasy baseball? Can it be exploited? If so, how? Can BABS help?

Let’s see…

As a starting point, the entire BABS database (back to 2014, the oldest year available) was mined specifically for power (Pw) assets. From 2014 to the present (2019), the total number of players with a power asset, based on current season data (not projected): 

2014: 245

2015: 263

2016: 258

2017: 200

2018: 210

2019: 209

Despite the league-wide home-run craze, there is a downward trend in power assets overall. This seems counterintuitive. Of course, BABS’ data is not intended to measure precise HR output. Still, it appears odd that power skills are not rising in unison with statistical totals.

Is it really that weird, though? This is the same BABS that perennially poo-poos the power of Franciso Lindor. Maybe poo-poo is too strong: she is cautious about the gap between Lindor’s skills and his output. 

But, if we are being honest, BABS is not skeptical at all. The emotions derived from the confounding conclusion that Lindor’s power may not be as real as we thought it was, are purely human. BABS shows us the contrast, we then provide the reaction.

Sometimes, these reactions are cast at BABS circumspectly: Are you crazy? Lindor is young, blossoming power bat, 38 and 33 home runs don’t lie!

But other times, it’s like this: Wow, maybe there’s a wide range of possible statistical outcomes.

Is there more to the story? It might be reasonable to hypothesize from the above data:

1. Since BABS sees fewer players (in aggregate) with above average power, and the home-run rate is rising anyway, it must be the baseball. The “juiced” baseball doesn’t help the “real” power hitters as much (their taters just travel further), it pushes lighter hitting (read: average power) players over fence, hence more dingers.
2. It’s the baseball, coupled with the launch-angle revolution, that explains the gap in skill vs. result. Higher launch angle leads to more homers, but also more fly balls, which turn into outs more often than line drives, so maybe overall power metrics suffer as a result.

In a detailed study, number one was addressee, with this as part of the takeaway:

“The theory that middling-power players are helped the most makes so much sense that I want it to be true. The lack of anything tremendously obvious aside from the lowest-power few players legitimately having no home run power means that there probably aren’t any easily-found takeaways. Stupid new ball, with its lack of slam-dunk winners and losers.”

While it may not be a “slam dunk” HR/fly ball rates are rising. Maybe the “juiced ball” is a rising tide that lifts all boats. No one cross-section is helped disproportionately. 

Number two seems possible, as the decrease in BABS power assets coincides with the proliferation of the airball style of hitting. 

We dig deeper.

What follows is a breakdown of BABS power assets for full-time players, every year since 2014:

		Full-Time
	p	PW	P+	Total
        --      --      --      -----
2014	24	32	23	79
2015	32	23	25	80
2016	35	26	29	90
2017	41	23	11	75
2018	40	18	14	72
2019	51	31	9	91

Keep in mind, 2019 is not yet complete. It appears the extreme assets (P+) are in decline, while the middle group (PW), and especially the bottom portion (p) are trending up. 

There are certainly differing reasons for this, but the reasons are probably more harmonious than they are at-odds with one another.

The rise of the (p) group has probably to thank: the baseball itself and advances in hitting techniques (such as quantification of launch angle, etc.)  Some of the best “average” power hitters have likely improved their abilities concurrently with the introduction of the more aerodynamic baseballs. The same can probably be said of the (PW) group. Maybe the creme of the average crop rose to (p), and the creme of the (p) crop rose to (PW).

It should be noted that “stepping up a BABS asset class” is a murky thing to define. It is something BABS might project  one season, but the actual numbers above represent what happened, not a projection. Also, it would stand to reason that since the pool of “average” power hitters is the largest, more could “ascend” in one season or another, than say those that would “move up” from the (p) to the (PW) class.

What’s perhaps most interesting, as far as BABS is concerned, is the apparent conflict between the decline in overall power assets, the rise in the number of FT players with power assets, and the league-wide power spike. While the total number of full-time above average power assets has grown (could some players’ skills be more conducive to hitting this particular baseball?), the aggregate number has shrunk. Could this be BABS’ skepticism of the power surge en masse? Do the skills not match the output? Could a change in baseball construction explain this? This gap between skill and production is a feather in the cap of the Verlanders et al. who believe that the ball is responsible. 

The upshot: the middle-class (p) is currently expanding. This robust section of the power-hitting population is providing HR totals that may not be eye popping, but if you have 5 or more on your roster, you are probably not hurting. Have more than that? Trading from a position of strength might be an option. 

Again, the 2019 assets are dynamic. Some current full-time players could be part-timers by season’s end, and vice-versa. Assets can still change. The record setting HR pace says they probably won’t change too much, at least in the negative direction. As far as the trend holding into the future, there is cause for skepticism.

MLB now owns Rawlings, manufacturer of the game balls.

Rob Manfred stated during the All-Star break, “If we make a decision to change the baseball, you’re going to know about it before we change the baseball.” He was also asked if the league was considering making changes to the baseball. Manfred replied, “Topic under discussion, can go no further.” 

BABS’ maxim of embracing imprecision appears on pace to remain relevant.